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Hermeneutic Culturalism and its Double: 
A Key Problem in the Reflexive Modernization Debate1
 
Piet Strydom, University College Cork 
 
ABSTRACT 
Proceeding from the debate opened by Beck, Giddens and Lash’s Reflexive 
Modernization (1994), this paper seeks to clear the way for a more consistent and 
coherent concept of reflexivity in relation to the cultural-symbolic foundations of 
society. Seeing that Lash in his contribution to the debate inadvertently raises a key 
problem, i.e., the broad cognitive problem, the paper develops a critique of his 
hermeneutic culturalism. It focuses on the disparity between the position explicitly 
put forward in the debate with Beck and Giddens and the cognitive one which more 
or less implicitly comes into play throughout his relevant essays. The disparity shows 
up already in his treatment of the problem of mediation, but it comes graphically to a 
head in his appropriation of Bourdieu. To lend the analysis some profile and depth, 
the argument is supported by elements of a socio-cognitive theory which has been 
gaining visibility in both social theory and the philosophy of social science. While the 
paper is critical of Lash, its overall aim is to strengthen his contribution to the debate. 
 
Key words: cognitive approach; cultural models; hermeneutics; mediation; 
reflexivity. 
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With their recent publication, Reflexive Modernization (1994), Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash give sufficient contours to the phenomenon to allow one to 
identify some of the key theoretical problems raised by the debate. One striking and 
currently topical problem is highlighted by Lash’s contribution which not only 
interestingly refracts the debate but also sharply yet quite inadvertently focuses it. 
Whereas he on the one hand develops a plausible critique of the comparable positions 
taken by Beck and Giddens and thus points in one direction the debate could go, his 
proposal, which is highly resonant in the late twentieth-century intellectual 
atmosphere, on the other suffers from a by no means untypical ambivalence and 
hence unclarity. This paper thus proceeds from the conviction that the reflexive 
modernization debate can be fruitfully approached via a critique of Lash’s 
hermeneutic culturalism. By drawing attention to the broad cognitive problem raised 
by the debate, an avenue is opened for making more consistent and coherent the 
deeper, cultural-symbolic reflexivity that Lash envisages beyond the objectivistic 
level attained by Beck and Giddens. 
According to Jeffrey Alexander (1996: 136, 137), whose interpretation is 
obviously informed by the critical stance of classical and neo-classical sociologists, 
Lash's opposition to Beck and Giddens amounts to a brilliant critique of their 
utilitarian approach to reflexive modernity.   Like Durkheim and Parsons earlier, 
Alexander's interpretation suggests, Lash counter-poses a normative approach to the 
utilitarian understanding of the way in which actors relate to their social world.   
Instead of a purely subject-object, goal-oriented or purposive-rational relation, the 
actor is regarded as being able to establish a connection with and to behave towards 
the social world only as a member of a community.   The seemingly direct relation 
between actor and environment is thus actually a mediated one, passing as it does 
through the normative structures of the community to which the actor belongs.   
Where Lash differs from his illustrious predecessors, as Alexander (1996: 136-37) 
also realises, is in his understanding of the normative dimension.   Instead of a strong 
universalistic concept, Lash leads the normative through the aesthetic dimension so as 
to shed some of its moral quality and instead to acquire an ethical and hence a more 
particularistic sense.   Utilitarian relations are mediated by the ethos of the 
community involved and hence the community-based ethical judgements it permits. 
 This interpretation might well accord with Lash's self-understanding.   In my 
view, however, neither Alexander's interpretation nor Lash's self-understanding is an 
adequate guideline for coming to terms with the position Lash puts forward.   For far 
from simply following the classical and neo-classical, Lash centrally draws also on a 
very different strategy. It stems from the achievement not of the dominant 
sociological tradition but rather of the counter-tradition of micro approaches - from 
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pragmatism and the Chicago School through the sociology of knowledge and 
phenomenological sociology to linguistic sociology, social constructivism, 
ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, cognitive sociology and constructionism 
- which themselves have been transposed recently to the macro-level.   Rather than 
setting themselves off from social utilitarianism and thus emphasising the normative 
dimension, as did the dominant tradition, these approaches problematised the function 
of norms in social action and interaction, irrespective of whether universalistic or 
particularistic, by rejecting the assumption that norms are consistent and exert a 
determining influence (Joas 1992: 58).   They thus cleared the ground for an 
alternative conception of social theory which has become progressively more 
important in parallel with developments in philosophy, history of science, 
psychology, linguistics, anthropology, science studies, and so forth.   Central to this 
alternative conception, it should be noted, is neither the utilitarian nor the normative 
but rather the cognitive.   The latter concerns the classificatory categories or schemata 
or, more broadly, the cultural models by means of which people experience, perceive, 
interpret and thus make sense of both their natural and social world as well as of 
themselves.   This dimension represents, despite his self-understanding, the decisive 
dimension of Lash's position. He effectively taps into it by way of Durkheim and 
Mauss's famous contribution on primitive classification and in particular Bourdieu's 
influential work. 
 In the following critique, I propose to explore some of the manifestations and 
consequences of the disparity between the hermeneutic communitarian or culturalist 
position that Lash explicitly puts forward in the course of his debate with Beck and 
Giddens and the cognitive one that more or less implicitly comes into play throughout 
his two influential essays under consideration here.   With reference to some relevant 
recent interdisciplinary contributions, indications will be given towards a more 
systematic and coherent development of this suppressed yet irrepressible alternative.2 
 
PART 1: THEME AND VARIATIONS 
In his quite complex critique of the theory of reflexive modernization and his own 
proposals to correct it, Lash proceeds from an assumption that is not altogether 
unfamiliar to the tradition against which he pits himself.   It is the threefold 
conceptual configuration of the cognitive, the normative and the aesthetic which was 
made famous by Kant's three critiques and Hegel's philosophy of mind, made its 
reappearance in Neo-Kantians such as Weber, and in different ways came to play a 
central role in social theory from Parsons to Habermas.   Given the strategic decisions 
he makes in developing his theoretical position, however, Lash introduces a twist 
which has the effect of distributing the emphasis in a particular way.   Rather than the 
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cognitive, normative and aesthetic, he (1994a: 165) speaks of the ‘cognitive, aesthetic 
and hermeneutic-communitarian 'moments'‘.   He indeed insists that, while regarding 
all three moments as essential, his emphasis on the hermeneutic or communitarian 
dimension is occasioned by the contemporary tendency in the social sciences towards 
the over-valuation of the cognitive-utilitarian and of aesthetic-expressive 
individualism.   Yet this does not significantly affect the peculiar distribution of 
emphasis that is characteristic of his theoretical position. 
 Lash's contribution to the reflexive modernity debate is best seen against the 
background of the above-mentioned threefold configuration, while the theoretical 
position he develops and in particular its various implications become intelligible 
only in the light of his variations on this principal theme.   The following analysis 
(PART 1) will thus be opened with a consideration of Lash's critique of Beck and 
Giddens (1) and will then successively dwell on his particular understanding of the 
threefold theoretical scheme (2 and 3) and the various moves that he makes in 
relation to it - i.e., from the cognitive to the aesthetic (4) and from the aesthetic to the 
hermeneutic (5).   In the course of this analysis, a series of questions will be raised 
which will in turn make possible a critique in PART 2 of the paper. 
 
1. Critique of Beck and Giddens 
In terms of the figure of thought of the cognitive, the normative and the aesthetic, 
Lash criticises Beck and Giddens for sailing under the flag of the cognitive.   The 
critique is for the most part methodologically focused, but by locating their work in 
the broader Enlightenment tradition, to which in turn can be opposed the 
Enlightenment-critical counter-tradition of authors such as Nietzsche, Adorno and 
Heidegger, he is also able to extend it both in an epistemological and a substantive 
direction. 
 (i) Methodologically, a series of related distinctions that are basic to the 
writings of Beck and Giddens serve as Lash's object of critique.   Among them are the 
dichotomies between tradition and modernity, the social actor and expert systems, 
and self-reflexivity and structural reflexivity.    All of them are questioned since each 
in one way or another presupposes an approach to social reality that accepts a direct 
or unmediated relation between actor and social world.   The actor is regarded as 
relating to his or her environment in a strictly conceptual and instrumental or 
utilitarian manner rather than as engaging in creative social action which is structured 
in terms of cultural forms yet exhibits a wide margin of contingency.   In the course 
of his critique, Lash calls on a variety of examples of the kind of mediating cultural 
structures, forms, or mechanisms he has in mind.   They stretch from information and 
communication structures characteristic of the late twentieth century mode of 
 4 
Published in European Journal of Social Theory 2(1), 1999, pp. 45‐69. 
 
information through communal relations of commitment and trust to conceptual 
symbols, mimetic symbols, and unthought classificatory categories or schemata.   In 
due course, I shall return to the problem of mediation which is at the core of Lash's 
position. 
 (ii) Taking the critique a step further, Lash attacks the epistemological 
presupposition of a subject-object relation which not only informs Beck and 
Giddens's utilitarian approach but also eventuates theoretically in their objectivistic 
treatment of reflexive modernization.   In its stead, he adopts a hermeneutic 
epistemology which proceeds from the assumption that ‘the knower is in the same 
world as and 'dwells among' the things and other human beings whose truth she 
seeks’ (Lash 1994a: 157).   Indeed, he explicitly aligns himself with the early 
Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology (Lash 1994a: 117, 148, 151, 157, 164) in a 
move that represents the most basic and most central alliance that he strikes in the 
essays under discussion.   It is therefore a relation that is of the greatest importance 
for an adequate evaluation of Lash's work.   It is remarkable that he refers to 
Heidegger where it would not be untypical today, especially in the wake of the signal 
contribution of Apel, Habermas, Bernstein, Rorty and Hesse and the emergence of the 
post-empiricist philosophy of science, to display an awareness of the joint 
significance of hermeneutic phenomenology and pragmatism.3   Although Lash is 
regarded by some (e.g. Alexander 1996) as one of the leading theorists in 
contemporary European sociology, he adopts a distinctly American version of 
Heideggerian practical hermeneutics first presented by Hubert Dreyfus (1979, 1980, 
1981) as contrasting with Quinean theoretical hermeneutics.4 
 (iii) At the substantive level, finally, Lash sees Beck and Giddens's attachment 
to the dominant epistemological and utilitarian tradition as eventuating in a 
commitment to modernity that is essentially uncritical.   This is more readily apparent 
in the case of Giddens who positively embraces abstract expert systems, including 
sociology, as embodying trust relations and hence as the only means whereby the 
pressing contemporary problem of ontological insecurity can at all be dealt with.   
But the same is true even of Beck, in spite of the fact that he takes pleasure in 
registering an increasing freedom from and critique of science, technology and the 
political system.   What he envisages is a risk society in which environmental hazards 
are minimised to such a degree that it would be possible to speak meaningfully of the 
further modernization of society.   Following Maarten Hajer, whom Beck (1996) has 
in the meantime started to find more and more appealing, this could be called 
‘ecological modernization’.   For Lash (1994a: 140), however, Beck and Giddens's 
respective theories of reflexive modernization are ultimately uncritical since both 
focus on reflexivity in the context of modernity as the means through which tradition 
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is transformed rather than through which such phenomena as commodification, 
bureaucratisation and the reification of forms of life are suspiciously penetrated. 
 Considering his multi-level analysis, it is not surprising that Lash makes use a 
whole series of adjectives to express the various strands of his critique.   Depending 
on whether in an epistemological, methodological or theoretical context, what he 
regards as the essential one-sidedness (Lash 1994a: 140) of both their positions is 
critically identified as being objectivist, realist, conceptualist, rationalist, scientistic, 
utilitarian, or universalistic.   But if there is one single characterisation that he prefers 
to apply in all of these different contexts and that therefore best encapsulates the 
animus of his critique, then it is represented by the word ‘cognitive’ and its cognates.   
The fundamental objection that Beck and Giddens's work is essentially one-sided in 
the sense of being cognitive captures the very thrust of Lash critique. 
 Before going into what Lash understands by this, let us note that it is precisely 
his characterisation of the positions of Beck and Giddens as cognitive in a very 
specific sense that he sees as compelling him to make a lateral shift towards its 
opposite, namely the aesthetic, and from there again to the hermeneutic. 
 
2. Lash's Understanding of the Cognitive 
Lash's understanding of the cognitive is in line with the argument regarding the 
hermeneutics of practice that Dreyfus (1979) developed already in the 1970s.   In 
fact, right from the start Lash takes a step that weakens his ability to recognise the 
cognitive approach to culture and thus to arrive at a more rounded and coherent 
account of his own position.   It consists of the adoption of a rather narrow traditional 
sense of the concept, without any reflection on its limits or any investigation of late 
twentieth century cognitive developments towards a broader understanding. 
 While references make their appearance virtually everywhere, Lash does not 
develop his idea of the cognitive in a systematic manner.   On the contrary, it is in a 
fairly haphazard way fitted out with a range of varying attributes.   On many 
occasions, Lash (1994a: 136, 140, 144) conceives of the cognitive in strictly 
traditional terms as having to do with conceptual thought, probabilistic calculation, a 
utilitarian orientation towards reality, and hence as being carried by the calculating 
subject.   On other occasions, he (Lash 1994a: 111) sees this same complex extending 
in the spirit of the Enlightenment tradition to modernity's universals.   Those who 
proceed from cognitive assumptions tend to associate universalistic considerations 
with modernity.   More generally, he regards cognitivism as being on a par with a 
rationalistic or scientistic orientation (Lash 1994b: 199-200). 
 It is on the basis of this narrow conception that Lash sharply articulates 
criticisms of positions which in his view entail cognitive assumptions.   Two of these 
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criticisms are of particular interest here.   In the case of a cognitive position, 
according to the first criticism, ‘...a subject is presumed, outside of a world...’, which 
means that it is concerned with ‘individualized, subject-object forms of social 
knowledge’ (Lash 1994a: 156).   In terms of the second criticism, he maintains that a 
cognitive position, being rationalistic or scientistic, is uncultural and by the same 
token unhermeneutical (Lash 1994b: 199, 200).   According to him, ‘new and 
emergent fault lines’ separate the scientistic cognitivists from the hermeneutic 
culturalists.   By way of these two criticisms Lash advances claims that are 
sufficiently systematic to serve as a starting point for the introduction of an 
alternative point of view.   The latter derives from the cognitive approach that has 
undergone a spurt of development in the course of the twentieth century, particularly 
during the last two to three decades.   Under no circumstances, however, does it admit 
of being reduced to Lash's understanding of the matter.   And what is more, it exposes 
his perception of new and emergent fault lines as a misjudgement of late twentieth 
century intellectual developments. 
 To avoid possible misunderstanding, it is advisable to point out that a critical 
analysis of Lash is not presented here in defence of Beck and Giddens.   On the 
contrary, I tend to agree with Lash's critique of these two authors.   What I am 
seeking to draw attention to instead is the fact that, while Lash employs a traditional 
understanding of the cognitive to develop a plausible critique of Beck and Giddens, 
he allows this understanding to mislead him to the detriment of a coherent 
articulation of his own position into rejecting the late twentieth century cognitive 
approach as a whole.   It is not simply that he lacks an appreciation of the fact that 
various developments upon which he himself draws make full sense only within the 
framework of what has been called ‘the cognitive paradigm’ (De Mey 1982;  also 
Shweder and LeVine 1984; Holland and Quinn 1991; Eder 1996).   Even more 
interesting is the fact that his continual attempt to suppress it eventuates in the 
spectacle of the sporadic reassertion of this irrepressible approach throughout his 
contribution to the reflexive modernization debate. 
 
3. Introducing the Cognitive Approach 
To introduce the cognitive approach,5 let us consider Lash's above-mentioned two 
criticisms. 
 (i) The first criticism involves Lash's claim that any position proceeding from 
cognitive assumptions remains irredeemably caught up in traditional epistemology 
and therefore upholds a subject-object form of knowledge.   In so far as cognition was 
traditionally emphasised in epistemology and in so far as Beck and Giddens still 
remain attached to this assumption, he might indeed be correct.   Yet this does not 
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imply that his criticism can be extended indiscriminately.   New departures in 
pragmatism (Peirce, Mead), phenomenology (Husserl, Schutz), hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Heidegger) and the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim) during the 
early twentieth century, their reinforcement by innovations in philosophy 
(Wittgenstein, Toulmin), psychology (Piaget) and the history of science (Kuhn) under 
the impact of transformational linguistics (Chomsky) and computer technology 
(Minsky), and finally wide-ranging disciplinary and interdisciplinary developments,6 
all contributed decisively to the emergence of a new, differentiated cognitive 
approach which can no longer be understood in terms of the traditional conception of 
the cognitive.   The emergence of this new approach was predicated on a rather 
complex fundamental shift of emphasis, but there is one strand that is of particular 
interest here.   It consists of the displacement in the course of the demise of 
epistemology of precisely the assumption of the solipsistic subject-object relation by 
a concern with the organising activity of the subject who is itself understood as 
embedded in a collective world view and corresponding form of life (Piaget 1970; 
Nowotny 1973: 291; De Mey 1982: 26-27). 
 Far from presupposing a distinction between subject and world, with the 
subject being outside the world, as Lash thinks, the cognitive approach proceeds from 
the assumption of a world view plus form of life which precedes any distinction that 
may be made between subject and world.   Any such distinction proceeds from the 
world view and form of life and can only be made within those confines.   Having 
undergone a radical transformation, the problem of knowledge in the cognitive 
approach thus differs sharply from what Lash imagines.   Rather than the problem of 
how something out there in the world manages to get inside the subject, the question 
arises as to how something that forms part of the world is able to develop an 
orientation towards, a model of, and a mode of behaviour in relation to the whole 
within which it locates itself as differing from the world.   And what complicates this 
problem still further is the fact that there is not just one something that forms part of 
the world, but many.   Rather than a sole subject, there is a plurality of distinct 
culturally and socially bounded cognitive processes. 
 (ii) The second criticism entails the equally erroneous claim that any position 
involving cognitive assumptions is uncultural or perhaps even anti-cultural.   Again, 
Lash might well be correct in criticising Beck and Giddens for being insensitive or, at 
least, not sufficiently sensitive to culture, and in fact I tend to agree with him on this.   
But the fact that this judgement is correct does not mean that it applies with equal 
force also to the late twentieth century cognitive approach.   Indeed, I am convinced 
that Lash should be resolutely corrected here.   There is enough evidence of the 
availability of a sociologically significant cognitive theory of culture and, indeed, of 
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the fruitfulness of this approach to culture to do so in a justifiable way.7   It could be 
argued even more strongly that the marked increase in cultural sensitivity in so many 
disciplines during the second half of our century can to a significant degree be 
attributed to the cognitive turn in intellectual life.   Speaking as a sociologist of 
scientific knowledge, Helga Nowotny (1973: 282-83) for instance pointed out many 
years ago that it was the emergence of the cognitive approach that fractured the 
conventional assumption of linear progress - which implies among other things also 
the tradition-modernity distinction, an unmediated relation between actor and 
environment, and the identification of modernity and universalism - and in its stead 
underlined the need to develop an ability to identify the whole range of culturally 
defined alternatives.   The cognitive approach in its proper social scientific form, 
contrary to Lash's claim, is by its very nature a culturally sensitive approach. 
 It is most remarkable that Lash himself unwittingly employs what is actually a 
cognitive theory of culture.   The conceptual triad of the cognitive, the normative and 
the aesthetic of which he makes such basic use is in fact a cognitive model (see e.g. 
Habermas 1984/87, Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Eder 1993, 1996).   Forming part of 
a cognitive theory of culture, these three moments refer to cognitive patterns taking 
the form of cognitive structures, cultural models or schemata of different types.   
Included among them are not only the cognitive in the narrow sense of the word, but 
also the normative and aesthetic - or rather the aesthetic-conative.   The fact of the 
matter is that culturally available and culturally acquired knowledge, far from being 
of a purely rational representational kind, as Lash at times seems to think, equally 
takes the form of myths and codes as well as directions and motivations shared as 
meanings or habits acquired through interaction (see e.g. Holland and Quinn 1991, 
Shweder and LeVine 1993).   These cognitive patterns (rather than merely norms) on 
the one hand guide and give direction to fundamental cognitive processes and on the 
other are reconstituted and changed by such processes in that it is through them that 
the patterns are imposed in the first place and through which the context within which 
they exert their structuring effect is periodically altered.   This suggests that the 
cognitive approach is a complex one that is concerned with both the generative 
capacity and the organisation of culture, with both constructive practices and 
cognitive structures or cultural models.   Of particular importance here, given Lash's 
culturalist opposition to utilitarianism, is that the cognitive approach focuses on 
cognitive processes in the production, change and organization of social reality rather 
than on its normative integration. 
 In order to demonstrate the relevance of the cognitive approach to the 
discussion of Lash in this paper, however, it is necessary at this stage first to return to 
his strategy of laterally shifting from the cognitive to the aesthetic and from there 
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again to the hermeneutic-communitarian moment, and then to critically analyse his 
sustained objection against cognitivism from his chosen standpoint of a Heideggerian 
practical hermeneutics supplemented by Bourdieu - what he (Lash 1994a: 166) calls a 
‘radical hermeneutics of retrieval’. 
 
4. From the Cognitive to the Aesthetic 
In Lash's view, the theory of reflexive modernization put forward in different variants 
by Beck and Giddens is irredeemably lopsided due to a partial emphasis on the 
cognitive dimension.   For him, the result of this distorting one-sidedness is both 
wide-ranging and thoroughgoing. 
 Epistemologically, they proceed in an objectivistic or realist manner;  
methodologically, a utilitarian approach falls into place;  theoretically, modernity is 
treated as a historical epoch with which is uncritically associated universalistic 
standards.   This position as a whole entails not only a neglect of interpretative 
knowledge and of culture and the mediating role it plays, but also an inordinate 
emphasis on institutions and experts to the exclusion of an increasingly important 
extra-institutional dimension of everyday life and cultural politics.   It even 
compounds the worst features of modernity in that the central concern with risk and 
insecurity facilitates or celebrates the perpetuation of a probabilistic calculative mode 
of conduct and the colonisation of the lifeworld by expert-systems (Lash 1994a: 140-
41).   It is this diagnosed cognitive one-sidedness of the theory of reflexive 
modernization, much of which one could heartily agree with, that Lash sees as 
necessitating a shift towards the opposite moment of the aesthetic. 
 Having already partially corrected Beck and Giddens from a more cultural 
perspective by showing that cognitive reflexivity requires the mediation of cognitive 
symbols circulating in the tracks of information and communication structures, Lash 
(1994a: 135) now insists on the irreducibly complementary role of what he calls 
‘mimetic symbols’ in the form of images, sounds and narratives which are the 
preserve of the cultural industries yet nevertheless possess a significant critical 
potential.   It is only by way of such a lateral move to the aesthetic that it is possible 
to penetrate beyond the late twentieth century ‘mode of information’ with its 
capitalist ‘power/knowledge complex’ into the ‘post-industrial assemblage of power’ 
and open it up to a critique of its mimetic constitution, i.e., its unique subjective 
attachment to and following of nature. 
 While paradigmatic examples of aesthetic reflexivity which clearly 
demonstrate its critical punch are to be found in the work of Nietzsche and Adorno, 
Lash (1994a: 136) favours the Frankfurt critical theorist for a decisive theoretical 
reason.   It turns on the fact that without mediation there is no possibility of 
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reflexivity.   Unlike Nietzsche, whose aesthetics allows mimesis only in the form of 
blunt immediacy, the Hegelian Adorno makes mediation central to his work.   For 
him, as Peter Bürger (1980: 169) has shown, mediation is not a middle term that 
allows two extremes to maintain mutual relations with one another, but rather a 
complex process of dialectical transformation.   Lash (1994a: 136) finds this 
theoretical idea so compelling that he centres his own position on it.   Accordingly, he 
regards reflexivity as ‘a complex dialectic of structure and agency’.   Here we 
obviously reach a decisive moment in our analysis which must be borne in mind in 
the rest of the paper.   The question posed by Lash's shift from the cognitive to the 
aesthetic for the overall assessment of his work is whether he actually succeeds in 
keeping the problem of mediation at the very core of his enterprise, as he undertook 
to do.   Let us wait and see. 
 However important the aesthetic might be for breaking away from and 
looking at the other side of the cognitive, Lash realises that it is fraught with inherent 
limitations.   Focusing on subjectivity, or more specifically the most basic mimetic or 
cathectic linkage between subjectivity and world, aesthetic reflexivity by the nature 
of the case devolves upon the ‘radical individualism...of a heterogenous, contingent 
desire’ (Lash 1994a: 144).   In the course of the past decade or two, it has become 
graphically apparent that aesthetic individualism in this sense tends to be the 
handmaiden of consumer capitalism which has in turn proved to be rather destructive 
of community.   Not only does it serve as ‘the grounding principle of 'expressive 
individualism'‘ (Lash 1994a: 135), but its anti-foundationalist deconstructionism 
leads down the cul de sac of an endless, relativistic and ultimately destructive 
replication of pattern upon pattern (Lash 1994a: 145-46).   It is this chronic repetition, 
this relentless sweeping away of foundations, which leads to ‘ever more Faustian 
forms of the aesthetic 'I'‘ (145), and the consequent ‘systematic impossibility of the 
'we'‘ (144), that Lash sees as compelling him to go yet a step further - towards the 
hermeneutic moment.   And that this is necessary is underscored by the fact that, 
although the aesthetic is the opposite of the cognitive, aesthetic individualism 
ultimately reinforces rather than mitigates the utilitarian individualism presupposed 
by Beck and Giddens's theory of reflexive modernization.   Cognitive and aesthetic 
reflexivity ‘remain arguably located in the same metaphysical universe’ (144). 
 This transition from the aesthetic to the hermeneutic moment, it should be 
pointed out, represents the most central of the overt problems in Lash's work on 
reflexivity.   There is, of course, the still more fundamental covert problem of the 
place of the cognitive. 
 
5. From the Aesthetic to the Hermeneutic 
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Under the impact of the influential late twentieth century Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-
Hegelian wave of a communitarian critique of Kantian and Neo-Kantian moral 
universalism and proceduralism, Lash uses Kant's third critique, Critique of 
Judgement, as the vehicle to accomplish the desired move.   Besides having been the 
focus of much recent attention, this work eminently lends itself to such employment 
because of its complex ambivalence.   Particularly important to Lash (1994a: 142-43) 
is Kant's peculiar treatment of his master concept ‘judgement’ as exhibited by the 
gerrymandering approach he adopted in this work.   Whereas the specificity of the 
work of art and of the beauty of nature forced him to conceive of aesthetic judgement 
as the assessment of a particular within the framework of a previous particular case, 
he nevertheless sought to maintain his general notion of judgement as the 
subsumption of the particular under the universal.   Also relevant, however, is the fact 
that, while it was once commonly claimed that Kant identified aesthetic judgement 
with pure subjective feeling, dissociated from sensation as well as from the socio-
ethical problems of life, he has also come to be seen as having introduced the 
postulate of a sensus communis to account for the correspondence of people in their 
appreciation of aesthetic objects (Stadler 1968: 377, 383). 
 The suggestion contained in this ambivalence not only to question the 
continued use of the concept of judgement in the aesthetic context but also to search 
for an aesthetic ethics or aesthetically based ethics of non-identity, gained a life of its 
own with the recent upsurge of the Neo-Hegelian concern with Sittlichkeit or the 
ethical life and of the concurrent celebration of aesthetic-ethical communities.   Lash 
(1994a: 142-44) regards this aesthetic, particularist, communitarian approach of such 
authors as Levinas, Derrida, Rorty, Bauman, Lyotard, Maffesoli and Eagleton as most 
significant and indeed valuable, yet not without a certain proviso.   As long as the 
fascination with the aesthetic keeps the focus riveted to the non-identical or 
difference to the exclusion of community in the sense of shared meanings, a 
substantial deficit will continue to call out to be filled. 
 This, for Lash, is the entry point of hermeneutics.   It is at this juncture that he 
wants to bring to completion the shift from aesthetic subjectivity, which has already 
been put in touch with aesthetically based ethical or community life.   What he (Lash 
1994a: 111, 144) proposes to do, is to make a transition from aesthetic reflexivity to 
hermeneutic interpretation, indeed, to ‘transform’ aesthetics into hermeneutics.   To 
salvage the shared meanings of community, to gain access to the ‘we’, the aesthetic 
concern with desire, ambivalence and deconstruction must be de-emphasised in 
favour of the truth-oriented and charitable interpretation of hermeneutics.   
Accordingly, Lash (1994a: 146) initially speaks of a ‘hermeneutics of retrieval’ in the 
sense of an interpretation that believes in its object and takes it on trust with a view to 
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coming to an understanding of its meaning.   He (1994a: 147, 152-53) finds more or 
less plausible examples of work along these lines less in cultural studies in that it is 
based on a utilitarian rational choice model than in Dick Hebdige's work on cultural 
processes and practices in subcultures and in Charles Taylor's socially committed 
analysis of the sources of the self.   But the models for which he ultimately opts come 
from Germany and France.   The kind of interpretation Lash (1994a: 148) has in mind 
under the title of ‘hermeneutics of retrieval’  is based on Heidegger's hermeneutics of 
practice,8 as it may be called, and approximates what Paul Ricoeur (1972: 28) called 
‘the recollection of meaning’.   Later, having faced up to the analytical bluntness and 
political conservatism of such an approach, however, Lash (1994a: 165) exchanges it 
for what he proposes to call ‘radical hermeneutics’.   Rather than trying to emulate 
the Apel-Habermas model of critical hermeneutics, which according to him is just 
another form of the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, Ricoeur's (1972: 32) second type, he 
claims to be following Pierre Bourdieu who, in his view (Lash 1994a: 166), operates 
with ‘a hermeneutics of retrieval at whose core is not consensus but power’. 
 The impact of both Heidegger and Bourdieu, the two of whom are by no 
means arbitrarily related to one another by Lash since the latter (Bourdieu 1991) 
indeed has a thorough knowledge of the former, is clearly visible in the position our 
author develops.   It is the hermeneutic-phenomenological ‘fundamental ontology’ of 
Being and Time that unmistakably announces itself in Lash's search for the 
‘ontological foundations of communal being-in-the-world’ (Lash1994a: 146).   
Unlike Heidegger (1967: Division Two) who is interested in deep-seated 
‘existentialia’, however, Lash expects to find these foundations in cultural 
phenomena such as the shared meanings, Sitten or customs, habits and background 
practices whereby communal meaning is routinely achieved (144, 147, 149).   This 
already brings him closer to Bourdieu who, although speaking like Heidegger (1972) 
of pursuing ‘the unthought’, is himself a considerable anthropological and 
sociological distance away from the philosophical concerns of both the early and the 
later Heidegger.   Following Bourdieu whom he interprets as offering a ‘sociology of 
ontological foundations - in categories of habit - of conscious action’, Lash (1994a: 
154-55) proposes to focus on the ‘unthought categories’, the ‘classificatory 
categories’ or ‘classificatory schemata’ which are hidden from view in our most 
immediate and familiar habits, practices and techniques of the body.   That a 
hermeneutic approach is and remains the appropriate one for such an ontological 
sociology follows, in Lash's (1994a: 155-56) view, from the fact that the 
classificatory schemata at the centre of attention are immediately given pre-
dispositions or orientations which, unlike rules or structures, require interpretation. 
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 If Lash's transformation of aesthetics into hermeneutics has earlier already 
raised a question about the precise relation between the two that will have to be 
pursued below, another question for further investigation is posed here. Why does he 
so emphatically insist on a hermeneutic appropriation of Bourdieu?   And why is he 
consequently willing not only to deny the relevance of rules or structures in favour of 
meanings but also to forget that he has expressly made room at the core of his 
thinking for the problem of mediation? 
 
PART 2: HERMENEUTIC CULTURALISM CRITICISED 
In the above it became apparent that there are various problems of different kinds 
present in Lash's articulation of his hermeneutic culturalist position.   Over and above 
these, however, there is still another and indeed deeper one.   In the following, I 
propose to focus first on the immanent problems (1) and then to proceed to the 
transcendent or metaproblem (2) I am trying to tease out by means of the reference to 
the cognitive approach. 
 
1. Immanent Problems 
Lash's transformation of the aesthetic into the hermeneutic, as previously pointed out, 
is the most central of the overt problems in the work under consideration   The 
theoretical steps that he takes in this context are designed to salvage reflexivity from 
the confines imposed on it by the aesthetic moment so as to make it available for 
retrieving the shared meanings of community in the form of cultural classificatory 
schemata.   Two issues immediately announce themselves.   The one concerns the 
relation between the aesthetic and the hermeneutic, and the other the relation between 
the hermeneutic and the normative. 
 (i) The first question is whether the transition from the aesthetic to the 
hermeneutic, which is the single most important theoretical step in Lash's essay, is a 
meaningful and justifiable one.   There is doubtless a need to move from the aesthetic 
to the hermeneutic if that means that individualism is thereby located in context and 
thus communally rendered less destructive.   On the other hand, this does not change 
anything in principle as the very problem that the move is supposed to have addressed 
is merely displaced to another level.   The place of potentially destructive aesthetic 
individualism is now simply taken by no less potentially destructive aesthetic-ethical 
community.   Far from being different, the aesthetic and the hermeneutic belong to 
one and the same universe.9   Both are similarly concerned with establishing a 
cathectic or mimetic relation with the world, attaching meaning to the world, 
creatively working out the ramifications of this originary act, articulating a 
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thematically systematic culture, accordingly forming a unique identity, and engaging 
in self-realisation and the good life. 
 While this is of the utmost importance since all humans require a goal of self-
realisation, as a strong trend in late twentieth century intellectual life has reminded 
us, the problem that Lash sought to address by adopting a hermeneutic culturalist 
communitarian position, namely to tame culturally creative action by drawing an 
ethical-cultural boundary around it, remains unresolved.   The reason for this is that 
the binding force he expects to emanate from an aesthetic-ethical community is not 
sufficient.   The move from the aesthetic to the hermeneutic as against the cognitive, 
which entails a general trajectory from the utilitarian to the normative, does not cover 
the whole distance.   It goes as far as the normative quality implied by the cultural 
binding force of community, but it fails to go all the way to the normative.   This is 
apparent from the fact that Lash consistently refers to community without considering 
the complication entailed by communities in the plural and the problems raised by 
their interrelations and interdependencies.   Another related indication is the fate of 
reflexivity after his hermeneutic turn.   Being focused on the classificatory schemata 
housing shared cultural meanings, it remains confined within the cultural bounds of 
the aesthetic-ethical community. 
 (ii) At this stage, we have already started to deal with the second issue of the 
relation between the hermeneutic and the normative.   A consequence of Lash's 
particular focus on community is that he (1994a: 156) offers an outline of reflexive 
sociology which not only operates with a drastically mutilated and diminished 
concept of reflexivity but is also shorn of any critical dimension.   This contrasts very 
sharply indeed with the claims that he makes in respect of both reflexivity and 
critique (1994a: 110, 140), and at the same time it falls well below the level attained 
by his model, Pierre Bourdieu, in both these areas.   Lash's hermeneutic appropriation 
of Bourdieu looses sight of the latter's reflexive sociological concern with the 
outcome of struggles over the application of classificatory schemata and by the same 
token precludes the possibility of developing anything nearly approximating the 
concomitant form of social critique.   At this stage, I reserve for later any comments 
on the cognitive dimension of Bourdieu's work, which Lash appreciates even less.10 
 At the root of Lash's inability to resolve the remaining problem of a 
potentially destructive aesthetic-ethical community (one that for instance on the basis 
of an aesthetically and ethically self-righteous construction dominates and excludes 
others), however, lies a still more profound deficit.   It is undoubtedly necessary 
today to be particularly careful with how precisely one formulates it, but there is an 
unavoidable need to find some equivalent or another for the Kantian requirement of a 
universalistic, normative reference point that transcends any and every particular 
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community and is applicable to the relations among a plurality of communities.   
Examples that have played and in revised form will continue to play a significant role 
in social science with a critical dimension are Apel's (1980, 1991) ‘ideal 
communication community’ or his more recent ‘planetary co-responsibility’, 
Habermas's (1979, 1987) ‘ideal speech situation’ or his later ‘normative content of 
modernity’,11 Wellmer's (1986: 126) ‘elimination of inequality and unequal 
treatment’, and Honneth's (1992: 9, 274-287) ‘recognition-theoretic concept of the 
good life’.   It is precisely a normative reference of this kind, whether positive as in 
the case of Apel, Habermas and Honneth or negative as in the case of Wellmer, that 
Lash lacks, as do the contemporary communitarians as well as the two major authors 
- Heidegger and Bourdieu - to whom he so profusely appeals.   His strategy of 
moving from the cognitive to the aesthetic and from there again to the hermeneutic 
thus leaves him normatively in the lurch.   The permanent tension between the 
universal and the particular is collapsed in favour of the latter.12   The significant gap 
at the very centre of his sociology becomes graphically apparent when one considers 
it against the background of the threefold configuration of the cognitive, the 
normative and the aesthetic from which he proceeded in the fist place.   A comparison 
of his position with it reveals a strangely lopsided alignment:  the cognitive to the left, 
the aesthetic to the right, and the hermeneutic grouped with the latter, while the 
centre, which ought to be occupied by the normative, remains empty. 
 It is of course my contention that the failure on Lash's part can be traced to 
more fundamental theoretical problems.   One of these is the problem of mediation.   
Previously, we have seen that Lash, following the example of Adorno, gave the 
theoretical idea of mediation a central place in his own thinking.   He regarded this 
concept as being of decisive importance for a theoretical sociology of reflexivity in 
view of the fact that reflexivity was possible only in the event of there being 
mediation.   No mediation, no reflexivity.   The surprising thing is now that, while the 
problem of mediation is maintained at the core of his enterprise for a considerable 
period, it disappears at the most crucial juncture in his essay, that is, at the point 
where he takes his own most characteristic theoretical step.   In his argument against 
Beck and Giddens's utilitarianism, it comes to the fore as the major corrective, and in 
the discussion on the aesthetic it is directly addressed and given a central theoretical 
status.   But when Lash moves from the aesthetic to the hermeneutic, particularly 
when he appropriates Bourdieu's doctrine of classificatory schemata, mediation is 
reduced to zero.   Here, to be sure, we once again touch on Lash's misunderstanding 
of the cognitive approach, but before explicating the issue in those terms let me 
describe the problematic situation in which he finds himself. 
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 Having taken Adorno's Hegelian concept on board, Lash (1994a: 136) came to 
conceive of mediation generally as a complex dialectical process in which structure 
and agency are interwoven and pass over into one another.   Later in one of the most 
problematic paragraph of his whole essay, however, we see him trying to jettison 
what he had taken on board:  ‘To have access to the 'we', to community, we 
must...hermeneutically interpret and thus evade the categories of agency and 
structure...’ (Lash 1994a: 144).   This rather peculiar attempt to step outside of socio-
cultural reality as a mediated one is subsequently, in another of those problematic 
paragraphs, pursued still further by means of an interpretation of Bourdieu's analysis 
of lifestyles in terms of what the Frenchman calls ‘schemes of the habitus’ (Bourdieu 
1986: 466).   Led on by Bourdieu's conception of the habitus as a basic disposition, or 
embodied knowledge without concepts, particularly by his playful description of 
schemata as ‘unmediated (or immediate) mediators’, Lash (1994a: 155) takes the 
classificatory schemata seemingly literally to be unmediated.   This is rather 
surprising, for he expressly decided in favour of Adorno as against Nietzsche.   That 
this interpretation of Lash as drastically reducing mediation to zero is correct is 
confirmed by his strong insistence that both structure and agency are irrelevant in this 
context:  ‘'Rules' or structures don't even figure in structuring the habitus; in their 
place are 'habits' and 'pre-dispositions'..... Habitus is just as far away from 
'agency'...[since it]...assumes a certain 'thrownness' into a web of already existing 
practices and meanings’ (Lash 1994a: 156). 
 It seems, then, as though for Lash the habitus somehow obliterates the larger 
socio-cultural reality as a complex dialectical process of mediation.   It might be 
argued that this mediationlessness, as it were, is not an insurmountable impediment to 
an endeavour aimed at grasping the core of a community through focusing on its 
primary schemata of perception, experience, appreciation and evaluation, and that a 
certain inevitable loss of context is a fairly small price to pay for focal clarity.   But I 
am convinced that the implications for Lash are much more serious than this.   
Despite the obvious difference between the two authors, Lash's reduction of 
mediation is related to Bourdieu's assumption that the habitus is not open to learning 
and hence is resistant to development and change (Miller 1989: 213-15).   And when 
it is borne in mind that this particular conception of the habitus is predicated on 
Bourdieu's postulate of ‘the virtual inevitability of relations of cultural domination 
and oppression’ (Cohen 1996: 138), then it becomes apparent that this, in turn, is 
comparable to Nietzsche's refusal of mediation, his blunt immediacy, his emphasis on 
the will to power.   This is the great irony that Lash's jettisoning of mediation has for 
his proposal.   Whereas he seeks to overcome the limitations of utilitarianism by 
recovering the shared meanings and practices of community, he ends up soliciting the 
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assistance of Bourdieu the utilitarian (Honneth 1990: 156-181; Miller 1989: 199, 215-
18).   Had he called upon Bourdieu the cognitivist instead, matters would have been 
quite different.14 
 
2. The Metaproblematic 
At this stage, it is possible to concentrate squarely on the most interesting aspect of 
Lash's contribution to reflexive modernity, namely his struggle against his double, 
cognitivism, effectively suppressing it yet calling forth its regular return and 
sometimes vengeful reassertion.   Both the main essay (Lash 1994a) and its sequel 
(1994b) bearing on reflexive modernity team with evidence of this unequal contest.   
Let us begin with a brief overview. 
 A recurring example of a relatively minor instance in which Lash has recourse 
to the cognitive, without apparently being aware of it, is his appeal to 
ethnomethodology (1994a: 156; 1994b: 204).   Ethnomethodology, as is well known, 
is one of the variants of cognitive sociology, albeit an unhistorical or ungenetic and 
micro variant.   What Lash calls upon is its conception of the already available 
presuppositions supporting routine activities of meaning creation.   Central here, 
therefore, is a reference to the ethnomethodological concern with cognitive order.   
Another rather more obvious and important example, already mentioned and to be 
considered in greater detail, is Lash's (1994a: 153-56) use of Bourdieu.   Cognitive 
concepts such as ‘schemata’ and ‘habitus’ are appropriated for the purposes of a 
hermeneutic position, yet this very appropriation exposes and even explodes the 
limits of hermeneutics.   Still another very interesting instance is Lash's (1994a: 161) 
characterisation of sociology as fulfilling all the conditions of his concept of 
community.   Although drawing on Bourdieu, Lash's circumscription of sociology 
gives unmistakable evidence of the concept of the scientific community first 
introduced by Thomas Kuhn (1970).   In the meantime, of course, we have learned to 
discriminate between the original ideological idea of the scientific community which 
was designed to secure the autonomy of science in the face of demands for public 
accountability (Hollinger 1990) and the cognitive concept which proved to be one of 
Kuhn's great contributions (e.g. De Mey 1982; also Apel 1980).   The only charitable 
interpretation of Lash here would be that he does not mean to confine his 
characterisation to the former. 
 Besides such minor examples, however, one of the centre pieces of Lash's 
theory of reflexive modernity could on foot of the available evidence justifiably be 
regarded, if not as cryptogrammatic cognitivism, then at least as entailing cognitive 
assumptions.   It turns on what he calls the ‘ontological foundations’ or ‘shared 
meanings of community’ (1994a: 144, also 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 166, 210) which 
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are the object of hermeneutic reflexivity.   This type of reflexivity focuses on the 
meanings that are already there in the sense of being inscribed in the practices of the 
community in question and are therefore best regarded as unthought schemata which 
operate below the level of conscious conduct.   As shared meanings they are indeed 
communally effective, but rather than being socially institutionalised or institutionally 
organised they have this effect, according to Lash (1994a: 166), due to ‘the force of 
shared meanings and habits’.   Similarly, he argues that hermeneutic reflexivity is not 
concerned with structures.   Indeed, ‘shared meanings and Sitten are not structures at 
all’ (1994a: p. 166).   What precisely the nature of the force he has in mind amounts 
to is left unclear, but it is difficult to see what else it could be than a force emanating 
from an orientation toward mutual care and understanding which is articulated with 
reference to cultural models or structures.   Be that as it may, the very fact that the 
meanings are effective, even unconsciously, in a cultural way implies that they come 
into play not simply socially but in particular cognitively.   This is the field in which 
the concept of cognitive institutionalisation (Eder 1996: 206) as distinct from social 
or normative institutionalisation finds application.   Along the same lines, one could 
agree with Lash that the force emanating from shared meanings does not involve 
structures in the sense of social structures, yet it cannot possibly be the case that no 
structures whatsoever are necessary to mediate this effect.   They take the form of 
what may be called cognitive structures, a relevant variant of which is what is known 
as a cultural model (e.g. Touraine 1988: 8-9, 54-5, 159) or a cultural form. 
 Lash is unwilling to conceive of shared meanings as structures since he seems 
to confine structure to the macro-level of late twentieth century information and 
communication structures (1994a: 120, 167, 213) and to equate shared meanings and 
classificatory schemata with semantics (1994a: 150, 162; 1994b: 209, 210).   There 
are a few things, therefore, that he tends to overlook.   One is that semantic worlds are 
by no means unstructured below the structural level he identifies, and another that 
meaning content at any level occurs only within the framework of structures.   It 
should be added here that, although regarded as cultural structures, his information 
and communication structures represent only a partial and indeed not fully cultural 
conception of macro-level structures.   The cognitive order and hence the cultural 
models of modernity go well beyond them.   That he assumes more than he gives to 
understand, however, is suggested by his central emphasis on the increasing 
importance in our own time of the cultural sphere which has itself become more 
differentiated and autonomous and his concomitant critique of Beck and Giddens for 
neglecting ‘the newer importance of cultural structures’ (1994a: 167; 1994b: 207-11, 
213, 215).   At issue here are not particular meanings or interpretations but rather 
cultural structures, models or forms - that is, the common ‘background assumptions’ 
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(Lash 1994a: 166) or ‘common classificatory systems’ (Bourdieu 1986: 478) to which 
individuals and groups, despite their commonality, give different particular meanings 
and interpretations. 
 A comparison of Lash's appropriation of Bourdieu with the position taken by 
the French author himself sheds more light on the spectacle of the former's overt 
dismissal of the cognitive dimension and his covert employment of it.   Lash's 
principal debt to Bourdieu is the concept of schemata.   Although we are not offered a 
proper analysis, it is clear that for him schemata have to do with shared meaning and 
routine background practices.   In respect of shared meanings, on the one hand, they 
are necessary for any social relationship to exist (1994b: 204) and, on the other, they 
play a guiding role in relation to practices which from the start involve the investment 
of affect (1994a: 157).   As we know, he is also characteristically emphatic that 
schemata should not be conceived as rules or structures (1994a: 155-56, 157, 166), to 
which he adds that they should simultaneously be dissociated from agency or 
constructive activity (155-56).   Schemata must rather be treated as the immediate or 
directly operating pre-dispositions or orientations of human beings who are situated 
in a seamless web of pre-given practices and meanings. 
 The first thing of which Lash should be reminded is that the concept of 
scheme, or the plural schemata, is a cognitive concept with a long history stretching 
from Kant through Schutz and Piaget to cognitive sociology and anthropology which 
has been combined in the course of time with a genetic point of view.   It is with an 
acute sense of this history and of what is entailed by the concept that Bourdieu (1986: 
466) focuses on ‘the schemes of the habitus’.   He indeed regards these schemes or 
schemata as unmediated mediators in the sense of a disposition or system of 
dispositions operating below the level of consciousness, but this does not mean that 
they are shorn of their cognitive character.   On the contrary, Bourdieu points out at 
the very outset of Distinction (1986: xiv), on which Lash liberally draws, that his 
concern with the habitus is a central component of his project which he circumscribes 
as ‘the project of objectifying the mental [or rather cognitive - PS] structures 
associated with the particularity of social structure’.   What he indicates here is that 
his is a broad approach which ascribes special significance to the cognitive 
dimension.   Making clear in what sense the cognitive dimension enters, he later 
submits that ‘[t]o speak of habitus is to include in the object the knowledge which the 
agents, who are part of the object, have of the object, and the contribution that this 
knowledge makes to the reality of the object’ (467).   That this is not simply a 
conventional sociology of knowledge but one that is fused with the sociology of 
culture in a way that brings out the significance of the cognitive is suggested by the 
fact that he insists on ‘conferring on this knowledge a genuinely constitutive power’ 
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(467).   All knowledge of the social world, and thus the social world itself, involves 
centrally the structuring activity of the agents, while these acts of construction, which 
are themselves acts of cognition and misrecognition (172), are but the differential 
implementation of ‘cognitive structures’, ‘symbolic forms’ (468) or ‘cultural codes’ 
(3) in the form of classificatory schemata or schemes of perception, experience, 
thought, appreciation and expression (xv-xvi, 2, 175, 467, 468, 471, 477, 478, 479, 
480, 482).   As against intellectualists, idealists and structuralists, including 
ethnomethodology and anthropological structuralism, however, Bourdieu rejects the 
idea of a static system of universal forms and categories oriented towards pure 
knowledge in favour of stressing a system or cognitive order whose classificatory 
schemata are constituted in the course of collective history, are acquired in the course 
of individual history within a particular context, and function in the form of practical 
knowledge (467, 468). 
 From this comparison it is clear that Lash not only overestimates the 
hermeneutic approach but by the same token also underestimates the cognitive one.   
What is a matter of structure and construction is turned into one of meaning and pre-
givenness.   He is able to sustain his hermeneutic appropriation of Bourdieu only 
because of two basic misinterpretations.   First, Lash (1994a: 155-56) misreads 
Bourdieu's critique of structuralism to the effect that what appears as universal rules 
of structure are actually strategically employed by different groups to mean that there 
are no rules at all.   Secondly, he (1994a: 156) allows Bourdieu's own deplorable 
tendency to portray the habitus as static to mislead him into overlooking the 
constructivist dimension which Bourdieu (1986: 170, 467) himself takes care to 
emphasize.   Later, however, Lash would again reintroduce this dimension. 
 As regards structure, it should be pointed out as against Lash, schemata are 
not simply immediately operating dispositions devoid of structuration, but in the first 
instance take the form of macro-level cognitive structures, cultural models or forms 
which exert a structuring effect and directing force through their implementation by 
the individual or group, even when they are strategically employed.   And far from 
being purely cognitive in the sense of conceptual, intellectual or representational, 
such schemata are also normatively and aesthetically or conatively structuring and 
directive by virtue of the fact that through interaction they are experienced as 
obligations and needs.15   As regards constructivism, Lash exhibits a marked 
ambivalence.   Whereas the habitus is initially presented as being devoid of a 
constructive dimension (Lash 1994a: 156), Lash's (1994b: 208-10) renewed 
reflections on the late twentieth century cultural society complicate matters 
considerably.   He is no longer able to dwell only on the hermeneutic retrieval of the 
semantic implications of cultural models in the context of the new reflexive 
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communities represented by lifestyle affinity groups.   Over and above the implied 
constructive relation of reflexive communities to cultural models, he is compelled to 
acknowledge the significance that the differentiation and relative autonomy of culture 
and the consequent value pluralism and multiculturalism have for the cultural and 
social construction of reality.   In both the case of schemata and that of 
constructivism, then, Lash seeks to uphold a position that is explicitly directed 
against the cognitive approach, yet in both we witness the spectacle of the excluded 
other returning and reasserting itself with a vengeance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In order to take up the unresolved issues in the previous paragraphs and to tie the 
loose ends together, I finally propose to return once again briefly to the problem of 
mediation in Lash. 
 Somewhere, Lash (1994a: 135) observed quite perplexed that reflexivity, and 
by extension we might add mediation, seems by definition to be cognitive in nature, 
but then went off on a tangent.   Subsequently, he adopted mediation as a central 
concept of his theoretical sociology of reflexivity, conceiving of it as a complex and 
multilevel process of the dialectical interrelation of the various dimensions of reality 
through conceptual and mimetic symbols, but then peculiarly enough proceeded to 
exclude the foundational pre-dispositions and orientations of community from the 
process.   Had Lash taken the time to unravel his original perplexity, thus freeing 
himself from a narrow concept of the cognitive and adopting a cognitive rather than 
purely hermeneutic concept of culture, he would have been in a propitious position to 
think through also the problem of mediation.   For mediation indeed is something 
cognitive.   It involves cognitive structures of different orders, from the micro- to the 
macro-level (see e.g. Eder 1996: 166-71).   The elements are available in Lash's work, 
to be sure, but they are left to languish in an unsystematised state. 
 A careful reading shows that Lash analytically distinguishes information and 
communication structures, shared communal meanings in the sense of common 
universes of meaning which are dialogically produced, and primary and small group 
semantics.   Although he explicitly speaks only of the first as cultural structures, in 
terms of the theory of culture all three categories can be regarded as cognitive 
structures, with each occupying a distinct level.   The macro-level is occupied by 
information and communication structures as well as by cultural models or cultural 
forms not mentioned by Lash.   Shared communal meanings, secondly, can be taken 
to refer to communal and collective identities on the meso-level.   And, finally, the 
semantics of intimate relations and reflexive affinity groups indicate the cognitive 
elements which are borrowed from cultural models and employed in the creative 
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process of the construction of communal or collective identities.   These cognitive 
elements are not of a purely conceptual or representational kind, but also include both 
normative and aesthetic or conative elements.   While the former could be norms or 
rules of conduct experienced as obligations, the latter could be mimetic or cathectic 
meanings attached to reality in the form of feelings or emotions and motivational 
syndromes.   Were the problem of mediation to be adequately grasped, then all three 
these levels of cognitive structures and their interrelations would have to be taken 
into account in the course of studying the cultural and social construction of reality. 
 Lash, however, does not do so.   This is the case not only in terms of the 
structure of culture, but also at the level of the theory of signs.   Erroneously 
contrasting mimesis in the sense of iconic signification with semiotics which is itself 
confused with Saussurian semiology16 and thus structuralistically misunderstood as a 
binary code (Lash 1994a: 138), he throws away his best chance to prepare at a more 
fundamental level to grasp mediation comprehensively.   Unlike semiology which 
views the sign as a dyadic structure, semiotics of Peircean (Apel 1974; Apel 1981; 
Habermas 1991; Rochberg-Halton 1982) origin proceeds from the assumption of the 
sign as a threefold process in which a mediated relationship is maintained among the 
sign or linguistic system, the object or reality referred to, and the interpretation 
community.   By contrast with structuralist semiology, semiotics keeps this complex 
dialectical process in focus and thus does not exclude the iconic but expressly seeks 
to account for the way in which the immediate qualities of experience act as 
mediating signs - Peirce's icon or iconic sign. 
 That Lash does not grasp the matter at this basic level is reflected in his 
difficulties with the problem of mediation, but not only there.   It also helps us 
understand better the other major problematic aspects of his work:  his suspicion of 
structure which he understands in a static binary rather than in a threefold processual 
way, his ambivalence about constructivism which properly understood requires 
attention to process and how its is structured, and his one-sided emphasis on 
semantics, including a paradoxical swipe at pragmatics (1994a: 150) while 
celebrating practices himself, but above all his cognitive sortilege, his gamble and 
double-dealing with the cognitive.   The latter, nevertheless, turned out to be a 
thought-provoking and instructive adventure. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The basic insight of this article goes back to remarks Scott Lash made about 
phenomenology in the course of a conversation some years ago in Florence, where 
over a longer period I also incurred a substantial debt to Klaus Eder. I wish to thank 
both of them, especially the latter. Finally, I am most grateful to Prof. Karl-Otto Apel 
for sending me his latest forthcoming work. 
2 This is the basis for a contribution to the development of the more general 
perspective that Alexander (Alexander and Seidman 1991: 26) calls for, one which is 
able to take together the different dimensions of culture articulated by different 
theories. My point of view is that of a sociologically relevant cognitive theory of 
culture which is underpinned by a theory of semiosis according to which the sign is a 
threefold process of mediation, not a structuralist semiological theory that treats the 
sign as a binary structure. 
3 This neglect makes for unclarity regarding the distinction between theories of 
praxis (or agency) and action, e.g. Lash (1994a: 156). On this distinction, see Cohen 
(1996). 
4 Lash himself draws on Dreyfus (1991). Curiously enough, although based on 
Heidegger, Lash's work also seems to contain oblique references to Quinean 
theoretical hermeneutics. See for instance his use of the word ‘translation’ (1994a: 
156). 
5 The cognitive approach put forward here has its basic reference point in the 
semiotically informed communication and discourse theory of the two leading figures 
of the Neo-Frankfurt school of critical theory, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, 
and is related to ideas developed by the younger generation, including in particular 
Klaus Eder and Max Miller. 
6 A sample of relatively recent, sociologically relevant contributions to the  cognitive 
approach would include: Nowotny (1973), Cicourel (1973), Habermas (1979, 
1984/87), Moscovici (1981, 1982), Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel (1981), Bloor (1982), 
Bourdieu (1986), Miller (1986, 1992), Evers and Nowotny (1987), Eder (1988, 1993, 
1996), Eyerman and Jamison (1991), Holland and Quinn (1991), Shweder and 
LeVine (1993), Knorr-Cetina (1988, 1994), Van Dijk (1997). See also Fuller (1984). 
7 Crucial contributions to a sociologically relevant cognitive theory of culture were 
made by Habermas (1979, 1984/87), Touraine (1981, 1988), Moscovici (1981, 1982), 
Bourdieu (1986), Miller (1986, 1992), Eder (1988, 1993, 1996), Knorr-Cetina (1994). 
8 This is the first of the two forms of hermeneutics Heidegger elaborated on in Being 
and Time (1967). In the first division he introduces hermeneutics in the sense of the 
disclosure of the meaning of existence as itself hermeneutic by nature, while division 
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two is devoted to ontological interpretation in the sense of the unmasking of the 
hidden truth of existence. See Joseph Rouse (1987) for an example of the 
contemporary use of these different forms of hermeneutics. Although Lash claims to 
be concerned with the ontological foundations of community, his hermeneutics comes 
closest to the first rather than the second type of Heideggerian hermeneutics. 
9 That there is confusion in Lash's mind regarding the relation of the aesthetic and the 
hermeneutic is suggested by the fact that, whereas he in one place argues in favour of 
a difference between them (1994a), in another he simply equates the two when he 
talks of ‘hermeneutic or aesthetic reflection’ (1994b: 204). 
10 In stark contrast with Lash is the use that Eder (1993: 81-100; 1996) makes of 
Bourdieu. 
11 For an immanent - i.e., a critical theoretic - critique of Apel and Habermas, see 
Wellmer (1986). For their latest statements, see Habermas (1996b) and Apel 
(forthcoming). 
12 In their recent report, the Gulbenkian Commission insists on the need in the social 
sciences to accept ‘the unending tension between...the universal and the particular’ 
(1996, 77). This is of course precisely the sense of the title of Habermas's book 
Between Facts and Norms (1996a). 
13 Not to mention Habermas's latest as yet untranslated work of 1996. 
14 Bourdieu's own problem is that he himself neglects to pursue his cognitive theory 
of culture far enough. Had he done so, he would have been compelled to qualify his 
own pronounced utilitarianism in terms of universalistic references or cultural forms. 
For a critique from a critical theoretical point of view, see Honneth (1990) and Miller 
(1989). LiPuma (1993) also puts forward a penetrating critique of Bourdieu's concept 
of culture. 
15 For a cognitive account of culture paralleling Bourdieu's notion of habitus, see 
Holland and Quinn (1991: 11-12). 
16 It is an understanding of this relationship that makes possible the resolution of the 
conflict between constructivism and realism in contemporary philosophy of social 
science. See e.g. Delanty (1997: 133) who speaks of ‘...constructivist realism in 
which reality, the sign system and the interpreter together interact’. 
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